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Pearson and Responsibility:  




Aboriginal Australian public intellectual Noel Pearson has gained prominence and 
influence for his brand of policy reform in Indigenous affairs by drawing upon the 
capabilities approach. This article challenges the coherence of Pearson’s position, 
arguing that his unrelenting focus on personal responsibility leads him to conflate 
different elements within capabilities thinking. Pearson 1) mistakes social capabilities 
(to which people are entitled) for human potential to be unfolded and 2) casts and 
prescribes personal responsibility as a type of latent capability. The latter a) inverts the 
capabilities approach wherein phenomena such as personal responsibility arise as an 
effect of the realization of latent capabilities rather than serving as latent capabilities 
themselves and b) is at odds with the liberal basis of the capabilities approach that 
rejects imposing “good” ways of life on people. This is illustrated through reference to 
Pearson’s advocacy of Direct Instruction teaching and engagement with the “real 
economy”. The paper recognizes Pearson’s contribution to the policy debate and that 
the problems he highlights are real, but argues that the remedial approaches adopted are 
problematic, including in terms of Pearson’s stated stance against assimilationist policy 
agendas.  
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Introduction 
In outlining his view of Aboriginal community regeneration, Noel Pearson has made 
repeated reference to the capabilities approach.1 Developed by the economist Amartya 
Sen2 and the political philosopher Martha Nussbaum,3 the approach seeks to establish 
the social conditions for humans to develop well-being. Among other purposes, the 
approach is a framework for analysing public policy and human development. The 
political programme is intended to create the conditions of political, social and 
economic “ableness” under which people can convert their natural but latent 
capabilities into valuable “functionings”.4 Because of its association with political 
liberalism, the approach broadly rejects imposing “good” ways of life on people, 
preferring to promote the opportunity-aspect of freedom by which people seek to pursue 
well-being in accordance with their conceptions of the good.  
Pearson has invested significant effort in numerous op-eds and papers 
attempting to distinguish his approach to Aboriginal regeneration. His main concern is 
to overcome the “poison” of welfare dependency, which he views as perhaps the most 
corrosive force in Aboriginal communities.5 In order to do this, he defends both 
                                                 
1 Pearson’s engagement with Sen’s capabilities approach has been examined in A. Duhs and L. Davidoff, 
“Capabilities, rights and justice in the context of Australian Aboriginal welfare policy”, Forum for Social 
Economics, vol. 39 (2010) and A. Duhs and L. Davidoff “Australian Aboriginal welfare policy: the 
perspectives of Milton Friedman, J. S. Mill and Amartya Sen”, The International Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Social Sciences, vol. 3(10), 163-170. 
2 Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (New Delhi, 1987). 
3 M. C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, 2011).  
4 I. Robeyns, “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey”, Journal of Human Development, vol. 6 
(2005), p. 95. 
5 N. Pearson, “Passive Welfare and the Destruction of Indigenous Society in Australia”, in Reforming 





engagement in the “real” or market-driven economy6 and the promotion of capabilities 
derived from a reading of Sen.7 To this end, he has endorsed, developed and introduced 
a Direct Instruction (DI) teaching programme.8 While Pearson has achieved substantial 
acclaim for his contribution to debates on Aboriginal affairs, there are serious problems 
in his adoption and deployment of capabilities and his desire to integrate DI teaching 
into that approach. 
In this article, we work through these problems, beginning by clarifying the 
capabilities approach and explaining Pearson’s conflation of elements within it. His 
emphasis on personal responsibility sees him invert the position of key elements – 
functionings and capabilities – within the capabilities approach. This is clearest in his 
deployment of personal responsibility in the pursuit of well-being – a move which mis-
recognizes latent capabilities, justifies the imposition of personal responsibility via the 
“real economy”, limits opportunity and risks treating people as means rather than ends. 
We argue that this miss-use of capabilities leads to the problematic (assimilationist) use 
of DI as an instrument of capabilities. Finally, we argue that there may be more effective 
means of dealing with irresponsibility, if indeed capabilities are Pearson’s concern.  
 
Clarifying forms of capabilities 
The capabilities approach is often misunderstood. As Keith Dowding9 explains, 
capabilities exist in different forms. In the first case, capabilities proper are general 
categories of latent or undeveloped capabilities which exist naturally simply by virtue 
of our being born human. We then have abilities which are circumscribed by our 
individual, private capacities, such that, while we may have the ability to learn a 
language, we may not have the ability to learn all languages. In order to make use of 
our abilities, we need capabilities as ableness – Sen’s social capabilities. These are the 
social resources we need in order to develop our complex latent capabilities into 
functionings. The key resources which underpin capabilities as ableness are associated 
with the sort of socio-political liberties in the Rawlsian tradition of political liberalism. 
Developing practical reason (a crucial latent capability) enables us to make choices 
arising from ableness in order to realize functionings. Functionings are our latent 
capabilities developed fully in accordance with a life that we find meaningful and 
valuable. In accordance with Aristotelian thinking, by developing functionings, we 
come to flourish.10 To this extent, there is a relationship between being and doing, such 
that as we develop our capabilities we become better at being human.11  
                                                 
Responsibility (Cairns, 2000); N. Pearson, “Radical Hope: Education and Equality in Australia”, 
Quarterly Essay, vol. 35 (2009), pp. 8-11. 
6 N. Pearson and L. Kostakidis-Lianos, Building Indigenous Capital: Removing Obstacles to 
Participation in the Real Economy (Cairns, 2004). 
7 N. Pearson,. The Cape York Agenda: Fundamental Transformation through Radical Reform (Cairns, 
2005), accessed December 5, 2014, http://www.cyi.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/Cape%2520York%2520Agenda%2520final.pdf. 
8 J. Walker, “Noel Pearson Teaching Model to Get $22m”, The Australian (July 1 2014), accessed 
December 5, 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/indigenous/noel-pearson-teaching-
model-to-get-22m/story-fn9hm1pm-1226972990901. 
9 K. Dowding, “Can Capabilities Reconcile Freedom and Equality?”, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, vol. 14 (2006), pp. 323-324. 
10 Aristotle, The Metaphysics (London, 2004), pp. 131; 256-257; M. C. Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach, (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 43; 72; 78-79. 
11 I. Robeyns, “The Capability Approach in Practice”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 14 
(2006), p. 95. 
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The relationship between latent capabilities and liberty as part of ableness is 
mediated by the important distinction between negative and positive liberty.12 In 
negative liberty, our liberty consists in our being free from obstacles to action. While 
most liberals associate negative liberty with the absence of political or physical 
constraints, there are those who include social, cultural and economic constraints.13 We 
are free when we have choices to make, even if we do not benefit from those choices 
or make the choices at all. In positive liberty, freedom consists in our being able to 
achieve and exercise self-mastery by having the necessary functionings to make good 
decisions. Self-mastery depends neither directly on opportunity nor primarily on 
choice, though the likes of Mill14 would regard both as essential means of developing 
and exercising self-mastery. In negative liberty, a person in an Aboriginal community 
is free, for instance, insofar as they are there are no legal, social or economic obstacles 
to making choices in pursuit of a life they themselves value even if it is of little benefit 
to their well-being, whereas, in positive liberty, a person needs to be equipped with the 
psychological, social and economic abilities by which to exercise agency and pursue a 
life that is of direct benefit to their well-being.  
The capabilities approach, with its concern for immanent potential and well-
being, may appear to be concerned with positive liberty (Deneulin,15 among others, 
contends that it can be concerned with nothing else). However, it is actually most 
commonly articulated in terms of negative liberty insofar as it eschews inflicting or 
prescribing functioning by endorsing “political liberalism” in the Rawlsian tradition. 
Indeed, Sen16 holds that freedom consists of the “opportunity aspect” and “the extent 
to which people have the opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have 
reason to value”, while Nussbaum does not wish to be “dictatorial about the good”, 
instead “identifying certain capacities, liberties and opportunities that have value in any 
plan of life that citizens” pursue”.17 The approach is, therefore, “a partial, not a 
comprehensive, conception of the good life”,18 precluding the ability of states to 
promote particular capabilities.19 The overarching commitment is to the “principle of 
each person’s capability, based on a principle of each person as an end”,20 with respect 
for persons meaning that “Capability [as ableness], not functioning, [is] the appropriate 
political goal”.21 The foundational commitment to capability means that  it is 
inappropriate to prescribe or inflict  functioning on people within the capabilities 
approach.  
In order to provide social capabilities as ableness, the capabilities approach 
focuses, squarely, on the effect of resources on particular people,22 since “there is 
evidence that the conversion of goods to capabilities varies from person to person 
                                                 
12 I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford, 1969), pp. 118-179. 
13 A. Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford, 1992); G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality 
(Cambridge, 1995); P. Van Parijs, Real Freedom for All (Oxford, 1995); J. Waldron, “Homelessness and 
the Issue of Freedom”, in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981–1991, ed. J. Waldron (Cambridge: 
1993), pp. 309-338; P. Pettit, “Negative Liberty: Liberal and Republican”, European Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. I (1993), pp. 15-38. 
14 J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford, 1998). 
15 S. Deneulin, “Perfectionism, Liberalism and Paternalism in Sen and Nussbaum’s Capability 
Approach”, Review of Political Economy, vol. 14, 4 (2002), pp. 497-518. 
16 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford, 1999), p. 291. 
17 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, pp. 69; 148. 
18 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 74. 
19 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 69. 
20 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, pp. 69; 5. 
21 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p. 87. 
22 Dowding, “Can Capabilities Reconcile Freedom and Equality?”, pp. 324-325. 
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substantially, and the equality of the former [resources] may still be far from the 
equality of the latter”.23 This means concern for the particular external and internal 
influences on a person’s ability to convert capabilities into functionings.24 The relevant 
factors, here, include health, lifespan, environment, labour arrangements, character 
traits and physical constitution. Those who suffer from certain disabilities or live in 
particularly remote areas require more resources to achieve functionings than others.25 
Given the general relative deprivation and heterogeneity of Aboriginal peoples across 
Australia, it would seem imperative, then, that both additional resources and a diversity 
of approaches are required in order to enable functioning. In keeping with the concern 
for political liberalism and the importance of the material and personal contexts on 
which people ground their attempts to function, capabilities as ableness is designed to 
allow individuals and groups the resources and relationships to convert capabilities into 
functionings in ways that they themselves find meaningful.26  
Central to the conversion of capabilities into functionings is practical reason, 
since this enables people to identify and interrogate goods in order best to pursue a 
flourishing life.27 For Sen, a flourishing life is seen to be grounded, not in “acting on 
someone else’s behalf… in light of someone else’s… goals” but, rather, in pursuing 
one’s “own values and objectives”.28 Although practical reason can only be developed 
socially, since it is a social skill derived from engagement with culturally constituted 
human beings, it cannot be prescribed or inflicted. People cannot develop practical 
reason under conditions of paternalism (though some, such as Claassen,29 argue that 
capabilities is dependent upon elements of paternalism) because they cannot exercise 
and explore choice.30 They are treated, in Kantian terms, as means rather than ends, 
permanently preventing their conversion of core capabilities into genuine functionings. 
One value of capabilities, then, is that the goal is to enable people to form and sustain 
meaningful (non-prescribed) relationships and to manage their own lives in accordance 
with their own commitments. This value is readily associated with the idea of personal 
choice.   
Underpinning capabilities as a political approach is a commitment to legal-
political equality, since this is a pre-requisite of the mutual and supportive relationships 
required to enable people to pursue particular ways of life that they have reason to 
value.31 Sen and Nussbaum follow Rawls in emphasising the priority of this form of 
equality in rights over material equality, favouring, in various different respects, a 
sufficientarianism in which there are thresholds above which material inequalities are 
permissible.32 However, as has been argued elsewhere, it is not at all clear that it is 
                                                 
23 A. Sen, “Equality of What?”, in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. S. McMurran (Cambridge, 
1980), p. 219. 
24 A. Sen, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, 2004), p. 486. 
25 Sen, “Equality of What?”, pp. 217-218. 
26 Robeyns, “The Capability Approach in Practice”, pp. 357-358; Sen, “Equality of What?”, p. 219; A. 
Sen, “The standard of living”, in, The Standard of Living: The Tanner Lectures, ed. G. Hawthorn 
(Cambridge, 1987), pp. 36-37; Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 30-31 
27 A. Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam, 1985), p. 10; Sen, Rationality and Freedom, 568-
570. 
28 Sen, Development as Freedom, pp. 18-19. 
29 R. Claassen, “Capability Paternalism”, Economics and Philosophy, vol. 30 (2014), pp. 57-73.  
30 M. C. Nussbaum, “Women and Cultural Universals”, in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of 
Diversity, ed. M. Baghramian and A. Ingram (London, 2000), p. 219. See also Sen, Development as 
Freedom, p. 18. 
31 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, p. 41. 
32 M. C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, 
2006), p. 71. 
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possible to circumscribe spheres of inequalities, meaning that material inequalities may 
impact upon the status of legal-political rights.33 
While there are commitments to multiple realisability of immanent capabilities 
and the shaping of ableness in accordance with local political structures, Sen and 
Nussbaum are neither relativists nor particularly reticent in criticising cultural 
commitments which undermine the realisation of capabilities.34 Where traditions, such 
as slavery or gender oppression or female genital cutting prevent individuals from 
converting their capabilities into functionings, they believe that action is required to 
effect cultural change.35 As such, there are grounds for intervention where people’s 
freedom as capabilities is contravened by others’ behaviour. If, for example, Aboriginal 
Australian cultural commitments undermine the ability of people to convert their latent 
capabilities into functionings, then there is a prima facie reason to challenge or change 
those commitments in order that capabilities as ableness are upheld.  
Accordingly, latent capabilities and capabilities as ableness are distinct but 
related. The latent form cannot be realized without the social form. While there is scope 
for diversity, not all cultural commitments are compatible with the political project and, 
thereby, helpful in assisting individuals in their personal projects of converting latent 
capabilities into functionings. Because they recognize the importance of relationships 
to functioning, Sen and Nussbaum need not be regarded as methodological 
individualists, but their concern for respect for persons means that they are ethical 
individualists, since all individuals matter equally.36 There is, then, promise for 
deploying capabilities in a context, such as Aboriginal Australian affairs, in which there 
is disadvantage, inequality and lack of opportunity. 
 
Responsibility 
Noel Pearson is widely recognized for mounting a powerful challenge to recent policy 
orthodoxy of Aboriginal affairs. The issues he highlights are real and require action, 
and the established means of dealing with those issues have been shown to be 
problematic.37 It is absolutely the case, for instance, that Aboriginal people suffer 
disproportionately from poverty and the lifestyle diseases which accompany it.38 
Although sometimes exaggerated or distorted for political reasons,39 these are very 
serious problems and Pearson has done much to highlight the severity of the issues.40 
                                                 
33 M. T. Johnson, Evaluating Culture (Basingstoke, 2013), p. 92; L. Wilde, “Marx, Morality and the 
Global Justice Debate”, in The Legacy of Marxism, ed. M. T. Johnson (New York, 2012), pp. 117-133. 
34 See M. C. Nussbaum, “Non-relative Values: An Aristotelian Approach”, in The Quality of Life, ed. M. 
C. Nussbaum and A. Sen (Oxford, 1993), pp. 242-269. 
35 Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 31; Nussbaum, “Women and Cultural Universals”, p. 207. 
36 Robeyns, “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey”. 
37 See D. Austin-Broos, “Quarantining Violence: How Anthropology Does It?”, in Culture Crisis: 
Anthropology and Violence in Aboriginal Australia, edited by J. Altman and M. Hinkson, (Kensington, 
2010) pp. 140-141; N. Pearson, “Nights when I dream of a better world: Moving from the centre-left to 
the radical centre of Australian politics”, John Button Oration (2010), accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://johnbuttonprize.org.au/about/news/post/noel-pearson-s-2010-john-button-oration-nights-when-i-
dream-of-a-better-world-moving-from-the-centre-left-to-the-radical-centre-of-australian-politics. 
38 See N. Pearson, “Positive and Negative Welfare and Australias Indigenous Communities”, Family 
Matters, vol. 54 (1999), pp. 30-35; Pearson, “Passive Welfare and the Destruction of Indigenous Society 
in Australia”; Pearson, Our Right to Take Responsibility. 
39 See K. McCallum and L. Waller, “Failed State of Health”, Arena, vol. 118 (2012), pp. 33-34. 
40 See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 2008 Social Justice Report 
(Sydney, 2009); Austin-Broos, “Quarantining Violence: How Anthropology Does It?”, p. 139; Board of 
Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse (BIPACSA). 2007. Little Children 
are Sacred. Northern Territory Government, p. 21; T. Rowse, “Re-Figuring ‘Aboriginal Culture’”, in 
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Moreover, his41 concern that assimilation has proven harmful, that there are traditional 
Aboriginal values through which to respond to current problems,42 and that alternative 
approaches should be adopted should provide grounds on which to advance new and 
divergent social goods. However, it is not clear that his diagnosis is complete, his 
prognosis most effective and his concern about assimilation followed through into an 
approach which avoids it.  
His main thesis concerns three distinct, but related, conceptions of 
responsibility.43 As Emma Kowal44 succinctly notes, these are i) retrospective accounts, 
in which blame for historical, contemporary and future problems is apportioned, ii) 
prospective responsibility, which is almost synonymous with duty and the fulfilment of 
roles, and, iii), an ontological interrogation of responsibility as agency, insofar as 
Pearson seeks to establish the extent to which, in the context of structure, people are 
able to exercise responsibility. Hence his refrain of “personal responsibility”. 
According to Pearson,45 retrospective responsibility for Aboriginal 
disadvantage lies, not primarily with the massacres, expropriations and oppressions of 
early to fairly recent colonialism, but the related introductions of grog and well-
intentioned, but passive, welfarism.46 Prior to colonialism, he argues that Aboriginal 
people were forced to take prospective responsibility for themselves since living in 
environmental conditions which necessitated individuals working actively to sustain 
themselves through extended kin networks meant that there was nobody else to blame. 
By virtue of this harsh reality, people developed the capacity to exercise responsibility. 
That is to say, they were agents. In this respect, robust demand sharing47 obligations to 
kin did not result in passivity among community members, since individuals did not 
have limitless wealth or resources by which to support feckless relatives. In Pearson’s 
eyes, Aboriginal society was one which traditionally emphasized personal 
responsibility.48 
Today, however, the government has accepted, in Pearson’s eyes, retrospective 
responsibility for the condition of Aboriginal people by virtue of its recognition of the 
                                                 
Culture Crisis: Anthropology and Violence in Aboriginal Australia, ed. J. Altman and M. Hinkson 
(Kensington 2010), p. 155. 
41 Pearson, “Radical Hope: Education and Equality in Australia”; N. Pearson, “A Rightful Place: Race, 
Recognition and a More Complete Commonwealth”, Quarterly Essay, vol. 55 (2014), pp. 1-72. 
42 See E. Watt, “The implementation of the capabilities approach in Cape York: Can paternalism be a 
pre-condition for participation?”, Development Bulletin, vol. 75 (2013), p. 39. 
43 See N. Pearson, New Approaches to Indigenous Policy: The Role of Rights and Responsibilities 
(Cairns, 2006). 
44 E. Kowal, “Responsibility, Noel Pearson and Indigenous Affairs in Australia”, in Responsibility, ed. 
G. Hage and R. Eckersley (Melbourne, 2012), pp. 43-56. 
45 In particular, Pearson, Our Right to Take Responsibility; N. Pearson, “An abyss beyond the bottle”, 
The Australian (14 July 2007) , accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/an-abyss-beyond-the-bottle/story-e6frg786-
1111113953532. 
46 J. Altman, “Noel Pearson’s policies embraced by white Australia, but how effective are they?”, The 
Conversation, (August 9 2011), accessed December 5, 2014, http://theconversation.com/noel-pearsons-
policies-embraced-by-white-australia-but-how-effective-are-they-2226; Watt, “The implementation of 
the capabilities approach in Cape York: Can paternalism be a pre-condition for participation?”, p. 39. 
47 See N. Pearson, “Shared Descent into the Maelstrom of Addiction”, The Australian (October 13 2012), 
accessed December 5, 2014, http://cyi.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Shared-Decent-into-the-
maelstrom-of-addiction_13-Oct-2012-Noel-Pearson.pdf; N. Peterson, “Demand Sharing: Reciprocity 
and the Pressure for Generosity among Foragers”, American Anthropologist, vol. 95 (1993), pp. 860-
874. 
48 See Watt, “The implementation of the capabilities approach in Cape York: Can paternalism be a pre-
condition for participation?”. 
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harms of colonialism. While it would not be possible to avoid such retrospective 
responsibility, the state has compounded that retrospective responsibility by failing to 
appreciate the true source of contemporary harms, continuing to exercise prospective 
responsibility by perpetuating harms associated with passive welfarism. The welfare 
system, Pearson argues, has excluded Aboriginal people from the “real economy” and 
interacted with historical Aboriginal cultural commitments to demand sharing to 
reinforce the passivity of welfare dependency, creating a situation in which those who 
do seek to get ahead through education, enterprise and labour are dragged down by their 
peers who leech their resources and condemn them for “selling out”.49 This creates a 
disincentive for taking prospective responsibility for one’s future and that of one’s 
community,50 as success means being beholden to kin who resent success while 
simultaneously being dependent upon it. This means that people are prevented or 
dissuaded from actively developing responsibility as agency. This problem, in 
Pearson’s eyes, is worsened further by an apparent propensity among Aboriginal people 
towards addictive behaviour, particularly with regard to alcohol.51 He adds, with regard 
to demand sharing, that  
 
when you add addiction to foreign substances and habits to this culture, things 
that are admirable and beautiful become deformed and destructive. Demand 
sharing and alcohol just don’t mix. Alcohol (and other addictive substances and 
processes such as gambling) cannot be managed when people are subject to such 
intense obligations to share as Aboriginal people are with their relatives and 
countrymen. The problem is most pronounced in discrete communities, where 
you have all of your relatives and countrymen around you.52 
 
Not only were Aboriginal people unprepared for grog, once it did arrive, welfare 
dependency amplified its consequences, leaving no reason or duty for people to stay 
sober, but leaving kin demand sharing obligations in place to support irresponsible 
drinkers as they destroyed themselves and their families.53 As such, historically 
beneficial Aboriginal cultural commitments are, today, transformed into deleterious 
path dependencies. The destructive behaviour enabled by these path dependencies 
inflicts capability failure on both the irresponsible individuals themselves and the 
people who have to support them.  
Pearson’s response to this is to emphasize the retrospective responsibility of 
welfarism in order to try to requisition prospective responsibility for Aboriginal people 
and create incentives for exercising responsibility as agency. For this, he turns first to 
                                                 
49 See Pearson,. The Cape York Agenda: Fundamental Transformation through Radical Reform; N. 
Pearson, “Choice is not enough”, The Australian, (28 April 2007), accessed December 5, 2014, 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/noel-pearson-choice-is-not-enough/story-e6frg6zo-
1111113425904?nk=d74f947c42ed2714bb7343062e0ee685; Pearson, “Radical Hope: Education and 
Equality in Australia”, pp. 8-11; also, in parts, M. Langton, “A New Deal? Indigenous Development and 
the Politics of Recovery”, Dr Charles Perkins AO Memorial Oration (University of SyndeySydney, 
October 4 2002). 
50 See Pearson, “A Rightful Place: Race, Recognition and a More Complete Commonwealth”, pp. 45; 
49. 
51 N. Pearson, “White Guilt, Victimhood and the Quest for a Radical Centre”, Griffith REVIEW, vol. 16 
(2007), accessed December 5, 2014, http://griffithreview.com/edition-16-unintended-
consequences/white-guilt-victimhood-and-the-quest-for-a-radical-centre/all-pages; Pearson, “Choice is 
not enough”. 
52 Pearson, “Shared Descent into the Maelstrom of Addiction”. 
53 Pearson, “Radical Hope: Education and Equality in Australia”, pp. 19-25. 
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self-interest, arguing that, if people are to regain control over their lives, they must do 
so individually: 
 
There was no mass elevator for entire communities or groups to ascend all at 
once. There are just the stairs, and no man is exempted from the need to climb 
in the same manner as one of Clarence’s murderers in Richard the Third 
answered the means by which he had come hither: “on my legs”. Individuals 
climb with their own legs on behalf of themselves and their families, in pursuit 
of their own interests.… the most powerful engine at the centre of development 
is the self interest of individuals seeking a better life for themselves.54 
 
This explains his55 claim that “Indigenous Australians now want our equal liberty. We 
want the freedom to take responsibility” for choices.  
Next, Pearson enlists Sen’s capabilities approach. In his “Choice is not enough” 
op-ed for The Australian, he56 argues that “without capabilities, choice can be a hollow 
conceit”. If Pearson means that, without adequate resources and the application of 
practical reason by which to make use of opportunities apparent in modern Australian 
society, then choice is hollow, then he has a point with which most capability theorists 
would surely agree. However, conceptual clarity with regard to his use of capabilities 
is missing.  
 
Conflating forms of capabilities 
Pearson’s response to the issue of choice is two-fold and, in the terms of the capabilities 
approach, problematic. In the first case, Pearson argues that economic development is 
needed in order to create “capabilities” of income and employment, health and 
environment, education and community and citizenship.57 But this is to misunderstand 
simple ableness (the resources necessary for converting latent capabilities into 
functionings) as either latent capabilities or functionings themselves. Sen clearly refers, 
in this context, to health, education and the like as social capabilities to which people 
are entitled rather than human potential to be unfolded. Pearson’s re-casting of 
capabilities language neglects the requirement to develop the latent capability of 
practical reason in a social context of ableness in order to realize functionings. Where 
Sen and Nussbaum are concerned to facilitate the flourishing of capabilities through 
ableness, Pearson advocates a program (via the “real” economy) to prescribe and inflict 
functionings, thereby treating people as means, rather than ends, thus defeating the 
Kantian ethical commitment which underpins the capabilities approach.  
Furthermore, the sort of economic development that Pearson favours often 
appears to converge closely with neoliberal economic models, promoting as he does 
the creation of capital through the exploitation of natural and social resources for 
personal profit under conditions of the free market.58 As others have argued,59 the 
                                                 
54 Pearson, “Nights when I dream of a better world: Moving from the centre-left to the radical centre of 
Australian politics”. 
55 Pearson, “A Rightful Place: Race, Recognition and a More Complete Commonwealth”, p. 44. 
56 Pearson, “An abyss beyond the bottle”. 
57 See Pearson, The Cape York Agenda. 
58 R. Connell, “Understanding Neoliberalism”, in Neoliberalism and Everyday Life ed. S. Braedley and 
M. Luxton (Montreal, Quebec, 2010) pp. 34-35. 
59 H. Dean, “Critiquing capabilities: the distractions of a beguiling concept”, Critical Social Policy, vol. 
29, 2 (2009), pp. 261-273; T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge, 2014); G. Standing, 
Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (London, 2011); Wilde, “Marx, Morality and the Global Justice 
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benefits of this sort of development are seldom distributed effectively to the sort of 
people Pearson cites as beneficiaries. Indeed, this base form of development contradicts 
Sen’s concerns regarding the provision of welfare services as an integral means of 
upholding freedom and promoting growth.60 More generally, there are serious concerns 
about the viability of the “real economy” in the areas most in need of action on account 
of their being remote and environmentally uneven.61 Questions of production and 
distribution aside, for wealth to be more than a mere resource, it needs to be associated 
with a range of appropriate, supportive relationships. It is not clear that the sort of 
arrangements Pearson promotes achieve this. Competition, for example, may produce 
greater efficiency, but it also raises serious questions about those excluded from the 
“real economy” on grounds of efficiency, particularly with regard to the possibility that 
their sense of alienation may be compounded by the notion that they are of little value 
beyond their labour.  
In the second case, through his focus on personal responsibility, Pearson 
mistakenly presents functionings as capabilities and suggests, counter to the capabilities 
approach, that these be prescribed – in effect inflicted on people. He returns, time and 
again, to the notion of personal responsibility. He states that his formula for capabilities 
is “Personal Responsibility + Opportunity = Capabilities”, arguing that one “can well 
have many opportunities in the welfare state, but if someone does not take personal 
responsibility, then no capabilities will be developed”.62 However, returning to the 
clarification offered by Dowding, we see that Pearson turns the capabilities approach 
on its head. In the capabilities approach, latent capabilities (which exist naturally simply 
by virtue of our being born human), with the affordance of opportunities (political, 
social and economic conditions), develop into functionings and human flourishing. 
Personal responsibility may arise as an effect of this pathway as a functioning or a by-
product of the application of practical reason, but it cannot be an “input” in a capabilities 
equation – it is not a latent capability. As a result, the outcome in Pearson’s equation 
(capabilities) is cast as an end whereas the entirety of the capabilities approach actually 
rests of the premise that capabilities in both latent and ableness forms are means to 
human functioning and flourishing. Pearson’s rendering inverts the capabilities 
approach because personal responsibility (an effect of the flourishing of latent 
capabilities), is shoe-horned into serving as a means of achieving things that already 
have to have been achieved in order for personal responsibility itself to existto arise.  
If we are to understand the potential deployment of the capabilities approach in 
the policy context of Aboriginal affairs while taking seriously the issue of 
irresponsibility that Pearson highlights, we have to rejig the equation and reconsider 
the notion of personal responsibility. The appropriate equation should be: Latent 
capabilities + ableness (opportunity) = functionings. The functionings of relevance here 
are those conducive to responsible behaviour. Pearson is surely right to think that 
responsibility is conducive to personal and collective well-being, but, philosophically, 
it is not a latent capability socially realized. Personal responsibility would seem, in any 
scheme, to be the fulfilment of roles or duties, in this case specifically with regard to 
pursuing productive ends and not burdening kin with destructive behaviour. The central 
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latent capability behind the fulfilment of roles or duties is, of course, practical reason. 
Without practical reason, responsibility in this institutional form is either impossible, 
since the bases of its performance are unintelligible to the actor, or meaningless, since 
it is the mere repetition of action, as Mill would put it. Accordingly, if we are to make 
sense of Pearson’s scheme, his equation should be: Latent capability of practical reason 
+ ableness (means of converting that capability into a particular functioning in a 
particular context/role) = functioning of practical reason as the basis for responsible 
fulfilment of roles or duties. As such, practical reason returns as the central capability 
to be advanced. However, Pearson’s concern for personal responsibility, and his 
attempt to force the issue by prescribing it as a type of latent capability, means that he 
advocates policies which may undermine the very capability that is necessary in order 
to make his approach meaningful. 
 
Diminishing choice to increase personal responsibility 
Practical reason enables us to see that addictive behaviour is destructive, not only to us 
as individuals, but also to those we care about most. By developing practical reason as 
our ableness expands socially, we diminish those ills and advance collective well-being. 
In order to do this, we need to practice choice in order to achieve substantive 
functioning. Rather than viewing alcohol and other vice as choices to be addressed 
through the development of practical reason, however, Pearson seems to suggest that 
we are better served by reducing or eliminating choice. He argues that living according 
to certain traditional commitments while claiming welfare63 is choice rather than 
necessity, “choice without consequence”, and “choice without responsibility”.64 Men, 
in particular, have made the choice to be unproductive or self-destructive,65 often 
slipping “into aimlessness”.66 Moreover, he claims that “indigenous and other 
disadvantaged Australians allow broad pathways for their young in their developing 
years, ending up with narrow choices upon adulthood”67 as the consequences of bad 
choices curtail choices later in life.  
A recurrent theme in Pearson’s response to this is to endorse forms of 
paternalism which cut the number of choices people face and, by promoting the 
remaining “good choices”, inculcate a spirit of responsibility towards the pursuit of 
those choices.68 In effect, it often seems that Pearson69 believes that Aboriginal people 
need fewer choices, rather than better choice making abilities (informed by practical 
reason, for instance). This is demonstrated in part by his qualified support70 for the 
Northern Territory Emergency Response (NTER) or “ Intervention” (NTER) of 2007, 
which introduced controls on alcohol and pornography and quarantines on welfare 
payments in certain communities, his development of a system of conditional welfare 
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payments in Cape York communities through the Cape York Welfare Reform Trial 
(CYWRT)71 and his more recent development of Direct Instruction Teaching.72 
While the constraints on choice introduced by the NTER are explicit, the 
intentions and effects of DI seem similarly constrictive. The approach is presented in 
the following form by its founder, Zig Engelmann:  
 
Direct Instruction is basically a simple way of teaching things so that a couple 
of things happen: one -– everything you introduce will be consistent with only 
one interpretation – there will be no confusion. And then the second thing is, we 
want to try to sequence it out so that it is doled out only one new thing at a 
time…. If it’s easy, it’s because you’ve simplified the hard.... The idea is to 
teach all the kids as quickly as possible. That you’re able to accelerate learning 
because you’re not going to reach tough spots… To provide kids with an 
education that would permit them to make the maximum number of choices 
about their future. You’re going to teach all those kids and you’re going to teach 
them all the things they need to know.73  
 
The programme appears to tie in with Sen’s approach insofar as it aims to develop to 
an above subsistence level of decision making capabilities and educate those from the 
most disadvantaged backgrounds.74  
There is evidence that DI is effective in developing basic reading skills among 
disadvantaged children, enabling them to dismiss “irrelevant” or confusing information 
in order to focus on things which are identified by the programme as important.75 
However, the notion that DI, with its scripted, inflexible lessons taught by teachers who 
are afforded power as the source of all knowledge in the pedagogical relationship, 
serves to enable children meaningfully to make choices is problematic. As Luke76 
reports, there is concern that “asymmetrical relationships of power and knowledge in 
the DI model… subordinates and mis-recognizes student and community background 
knowledge, cultural experiences and prior knowledge schemata”. There is evidence to 
suggest that the homogenising approach of DI fails to engender in children the 
exploratory and independent thinking behind necessary for practical reason.77 While 
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they may be able to learn rules, they may be less able to think on their feet as new 
challenges emerge or lack the curiosity and interest needed to deal with complexity.78  
Pearson might claim that, while capabilities is a general, political liberal theory 
of justice, upholding the right of people to pursue plural conceptions of the good, he is 
acting, here, to advance one conception of the good internally within an Aboriginal 
context to promote most effectively a particular people’s well-being. Yet, even if that 
were his argument, Pearson cannot prescribe a programme of functioning for entire 
communities within the broader confines of political liberalism. While capabilities are 
multiply realisable and need to be tailored to the particular cultural and environmental 
context within which they operate, the priority of liberty means that capabilities cannot 
be an entry route into a form of devolved perfectionism. People need, collectively, to 
elect to pursue a conception of the good under conditions of liberty in order that 
practical reason be developed and exercised.  
The point of practical reason is to enable people to navigate through the 
increasingly complex and intricate relationships, circumstances and possibilities they 
face. Practical reason enables people, pragmatically, to identify and promote their 
interests and the interests of those around them by working with particular people and 
resources within particular contexts and roles. Practical reason can only be developed 
through exercise – it is practical for that very reason. It requires elements of trial and 
error, since, by their very nature, the people, circumstances and contexts we encounter 
have features which are not immediately obvious to us, however well we understand 
reason in the abstract. DI is crude insofar as choices are seen as constant sources of 
confusion and potential harm, with methodical, almost scriptural adherence to pre-
ordained pathways promoted as means of avoiding having to make choices in the 
reflective way those with practical reason do.79 Put simply, it is not the optimal means 
of engendering “the rational base… that is needed for sustained intellectual engagement 
and the formation of personal intellectual goals”.80 It does not, in fact, lead to the 
expansive ability to “access, understand, analyse and evaluate information, make 
meaning, express thoughts and emotions, present ideas and opinions, interact with 
others and participate in activities at school and in their lives beyond school”, which 
the Australian Curriculum Assessment and Reporting Authority81 insists defines 
literacy.  
In the modern world, we need constantly to exercise practical reason in new and 
changing contexts. Our success in relationships and professions requires that we 
appreciate that single interpretations are seldom possible or beneficial. If we want to 
succeed, including on Pearson’s terms, we often need to acknowledge the radical 
complexity of life and the radical deficiency of single interpretation perspectives. While 
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it is understandable that Pearson should wish Aboriginal people to enjoy the advantages 
of economic and social advancement, it is not clear that the methods he proposes are 
the means by which to achieve that in the potentially rich and innovative forms that 
could emerge. We should not think that the regimented form of education proposed is 
a particularly effective means of providing people with the same capabilities provided 
by other forms of education, since it actively stifles the sort of exploratory work 
essential to forms of intellectual development associated with the dynamic and rich 
lives that the capabilities approach opens onto.  
This is independent of the critical pedagogical notion that the oppressed are 
oppressed by having, as Freire puts it, their expectations shaped externally: 
 
Integration results from the capacity to adapt oneself to reality plus the critical 
capacity to make choices and to transform that reality. To the extent that man 
loses his ability to make choices and is subject to the choices of others, to the 
extent that his decisions are no longer his own because they result from external 
prescriptions, he is no longer integrated… If man is incapable of changing 
reality, he adjusts himself instead.82 
 
In the colonial context in which Pearson expresses concern at assimilation, it must be 
troubling that DI places such power in the hands of curriculum developers to identify 
and shape choices. It is certainly not clear that this promotes capabilities.  
 
The “real economy” 
In general, though, the development of capabilities does not always seem of primary 
importance in Pearson’s work. Whereas in Sen and Nussbaum, the ultimate end of 
public policy is the provision, development and expansion of capabilities as ableness, 
in Pearson’s work, there is a clear commitment to the promotion of a particular 
conception of the good.83 This is apparent in his 2005 report on the Economic Viability 
of Remote Communities, in which he highlights three means of ensuring viability: 
enhancement of capabilities and mobility; enablement of engagement with the “real 
economy” by policies and attitudes; and engagement of people in both local and non-
local employment.84  
In the first instance, the holistic value of productive, but economically 
unprofitable, activities is overlooked,85 while questions about the value of the “real 
economy” are ignored. Pearson neglects, for example, to acknowledge the fact that the 
viability of life in rural areas has been threatened directly by the “real economy”86 and 
that the historical decision of pastoralists to dispense with Aboriginal labour rather than 
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adhere to equal pay legislation (the turn of events which leads to “passive welfare”)87 
was due to their concern for profitability in the “real economy”.88 As Altman has 
emphasised, there may be many areas of importance to people which are not viable in 
the “real economy”.89 In the second instance, capabilities slip from integral constituents 
of viable human development to mere instruments of a very narrow conception of 
economic viability.  
If the concern is capabilities, the relationship should be inverted, with the 
economy guided and bent to the advancement of human interests as means of expanding 
ableness. This does not deny the capacity of engagement with the “real economy” to 
promote those interests, particularly by providing resources for self-development and 
relationship sustenance in different ways. However, Pearson’s treatment of the topic 
highlights his misunderstanding or misuse of the capabilities approach, such that he 
ends up trying to use capabilities to justify, rather than oppose, constraints on 
autonomy.  
 
Tensions, possibilities and empathy 
Pearson consistently highlights the “tension” between traditional Aboriginal cultural 
commitments and integration in the “real economy” through the following binary 
distinctions: “immediate sharing and individual accumulation; loyalty to kin and 
impartiality to all; individual autonomy and the authoritarian practices of the school 
and workplace; individual advancement and remaining at one with the community, and 
exploiting land and living with it”.90 Although he refers to these as tensions in need of 
compromise, there is a sense that, in order to achieve progress, more compromise will 
be needed from those who endorse traditional commitments, than those who seek to 
introduce change. This is apparent in his powerful criticism of double standards among 
those on the left who have benefited from self-interest, but attempt to dissuade 
Aboriginal people from pursuing a similar path: 
 
We need policies that increase self-regard among the disadvantaged. To put it 
crassly: poor people need to become at least as self-regarding as those who are 
not poor. Until disadvantaged people become as self-interested as advantaged 
people, they will not rise above their disadvantage. Until we crank up the engine 
of self-interest among the under-privileged, we won’t get individual, and 
therefore social, uplift.91  
 
For Pearson, “Self-interest for too many progressives is anathema to social justice, 
when in fact it is the very engine of the justice that is sought”.92 The problem with this 
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is that the sort of self-interest advocated may ensure cultural convergence with the 
mainstream (something which Pearson93 himself regards as problematic), but and there 
is little empirical evidence to suggest that it results in a general uplift in social 
conditions (unless measured according to narrow criteria), even if there is evidence that 
it may contribute to economic growth. Given that Pearson’s94 Button Oration was an 
attempt to stoke change in the left, it seems reasonable for the left to retort that the “real 
economy” has hardly been an unalloyed success (witness the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007-2008) and that opening up Aboriginal communities (where possible) to the “real 
economy” therefore creates new opportunities for people to be subject to additional 
deleterious inequalities and pathologies. While at least some members of Aboriginal 
communities may find their material conditions improved, there is nothing to guarantee 
improvements across the board.  
Pearson’s account of prospective responsibility is one in which welfare services 
are pushed back and people forced to seek sustenance from productive activity, while 
his account of responsibility as agency is reduced to fulfilment of a duty not to burden 
others. In this respect, Pearson95 appears keen to replicate the unforgiving natural 
environment of the hunter gathering past, in an unforgiving capitalist social 
environment of the present. While not burdening others with frivolous or vexatious 
behaviour seems a reasonable account of responsibility, doubts about the viability of 
the “real economy” replacing welfare in certain regions of Australia not only means 
that the empirical claim of prospective responsibility is challenged, but that 
responsibility as agency is called into question. This is because certain people will 
necessarily lack the resources to sustain themselves precisely because of the economy’s 
concern for efficiency and profit. Under these conditions, there is the risk that personal 
responsibility as agency may be seen to equate to quiet self-harm for those who fail, 
and guilt-free self-indulgence for those who succeed, since, in the absence of demand 
sharing, success in acquiring resources means that responsibility as agency is exercised 
in full.  
Beyond this, there is the possibility that promoting the sort of competitive self-
interest which Pearson articulates may lead, as it has elsewhere, to “responsible” 
individuals actively excluding “failures” as they pursue their interests unshackled by 
demand sharing. While, on some crude utilitarian calculation, the emergence of 
wealthy, responsible entrepreneurs may appear to be an improvement on conditions 
elsewhere, according to the capabilities approach, we should regard with great regret 
the emergence of serious asymmetries, especially where material inequalities open up 
opportunities for legal and political ones. It is naturally the case, here, that successful, 
“responsible” people have greater access to the means by which to monopolize political 
positions, excluding less “responsible” individuals and, cyclically, helping to create the 
legislative environment to consolidate wealth.96 Responsibility, as Pearson articulates 
it, will not prevent this. 
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At a structural level, as has been argued elsewhere,97 capabilities can only be 
developed fully through relationships guided institutionally by cultural commitment to 
multiply realizable core values of solidarity, equality and non-domination. While those 
values may look different in different contexts, their effect should be the same – to 
check other values which would otherwise serve to undermine broader human interests 
by facilitating selfish behaviour, denying certain individuals the resources to sustain 
themselves and subjugating people to the whims of others. One possible interpretation 
of Pearson’s concern with demand sharing is that he actually sees the absence of 
solidarity and non-domination in its contemporary form, since irresponsible people who 
demand share fail to recognize the deleterious, burdensome effect it can have on others. 
These people undermine core values because they suffer from the failure to develop 
practical reason, but also emotions, such as empathy, which Nussbaum includes 
articulate as a latent capability.98 When deployed successfully in accordance with 
practical reason, empathy enables people to recognize the effects of their behaviour and 
take steps to uphold the interest of others. However, it is often the case that the 
competitive system which Pearson advocates undermines empathy, rewarding 
behaviour unchecked by concern for failure and the sort of core values which might 
promote everyone’s interests. 
Of course, Pearson may claim that while capabilities is a general liberal political 
theory of justice upholding the right of people to pursue plural conceptions of the good, 
he is acting to advance one conception of the good internally within Aboriginal contexts 
to promote most effectively the well-being of Aboriginal people. In effect, capabilities 
are one thing, but Pearson is doing something else. Yet Pearson does not argue this. 
Rather, he attempts – mistakenly we have shown – to leverage the capabilities approach 
to prescribe personal responsibility, Direct Instruction Teaching, and engagement with 
the “real economy”.99 Furthermore, even if this were Pearson’s argument, he cannot 
legitimately prescribe a programme of functioning for entire communities within the 
broader confines of Australian political liberalism. While capabilities are multiply 
realisable and need to be tailored to the particular cultural and environmental context 
within which they operate, the priority of liberty means that capabilities cannot be an 
entry route into a form of devolved perfectionism by allowing individuals to prescribe 
functioning. People need, collectively, to elect to pursue a conception of the good under 
conditions of liberty in order that practical reason be developed and exercised.  
 
Conclusion  
Pearson is surely right to state that there are certain issues, including alcohol abuse and 
the modern economy, which pre-colonial Aboriginal society could not possibly have 
foreseen and for which new responses are required. There is also little doubt that 
personal responsibility is a laudable personal practice which is central to societal well-
being. However, some of the policy responses that Pearson advocates require much 
more thinking through, not least because they are not consistent with the capabilities 
approach which he uses as justification and have been promoted and practised with 
mixed success elsewhere. One of the key problems that people face, today, is that the 
socio-economic conditions which are associated with neo-liberal reforms engender 
forms of precariousness which promote irresponsibility. As Guy Standing100 has 
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argued, engagement with the “real economy”, and its unforgiving precarious 
conditions, leads people to treat work and other money-making activities instrumentally 
in the absence of stable sources of employment, leaving no “shadow of the future” 
hanging over their actions and little incentive to sustain long-term relationships or a 
broader range of productive, but unpaid, socio-cultural activities. Far from engendering 
responsibility, these conditions can undermine the sort of rich, meaningful lives that the 
capabilities approach endorses.  
A clearer understanding of capabilities supports two challenges to Pearson’s 
work: First, to political attempts to impose forms of functioning (particularly personal 
responsibility) on individuals and groups, especially in cases in which those forms are 
narrow and second, to the “real economy” and its associated values. While other 
approaches may justify the kind of programmes Pearson supports, only a very 
unorthodox and problematic understanding of capabilities can lead to the prescriptive 
and potentially authoritarian and inegalitarian conclusions he draws. To build on the 
capabilities approach in Aboriginal affairs in order to promote rather than restrict 
human flourishing requires more attention to capabilities as ableness. In this respect, 
there may be productive and effective means of incorporating traditional Aboriginal 
cultural commitments in ways that avoid the very assimilation that Pearson criticizes.101  
Given the problematic fit of Pearson’s policy agenda with the capabilities 
approach, the reasons for Pearson using capabilities at all are elusive. In the first 
instance, Pearson is surely right to believe that we should be responsible. Indeed, 
historically, groups, like the one with which he identifiesincluding Australian 
Aboriginal peoples, created and upheld institutions which fostered responsibility. One 
major problem, which Pearson accepts, is that the disruption of colonialism has 
undermined systematically the ability of people collectively to sustain those older 
systems, to revise and adapt certain institutions to deal with challenges which could 
never have been predicted or to develop new institutions independently of Government 
constriction. In this context, one may speculate that Pearson deploys capabilities as a 
means of transcending discoursesEuropean and Aboriginal worlds, presenting a well-
respected approach intelligible to European policy makers as a means of carving out 
space for Aboriginal people and communities to advance institutions under the 
conditions of colonialism, and with the intention of enhancing, autonomy. If that is the 
case, the autonomy carved out may be a hollow one, s since as the Global Finance Crisis 
and subsequent revelations demonstrate, it is precisely the naked instrumentalism of 
neoliberalism, among other phenomena, which has can  undermined people’s 
abilityopportunities to pursue rationally self-interest achieve well-being. In 
neoliberalism it seems seldom that being real means being responsible. A more careful 
reading and application of the capabilities approach than that offered by Pearson to date 
may promote personal responsibility, but it requires keeping the principle of liberty to 
the fore. Such an approach would also facilitate engagement with Aboriginal cultural 
commitments, thereby going some way to support Pearson’s stance against 
assimilationist policy agendas. 
 
   If he wants people to be responsible and show concern for others in promoting 
their well-being, then he needs more critically to consider the impact the culture of the 
real economy. In light of the Global Finance Crisis and subsequent revelations about a 
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profession supposedly at the heart of that economy, it seems seldom that being real 
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